To arrive at the realization that the Seattle Seahawks screwed up royally on their final offensive play of Super Bowl XLIX, you needn't understand anything beyond the basic principles of football.
My mom and grandma, neither of whom watch sports, were both well aware that the Seahawks erred. I'm pretty sure the dog had a basic idea, as well. Bamboo Fiber Coffee Cup
But introduce some of the five W's and dig a little deeper, and it all becomes a little more complex.
We know the when, the where and the what. Sunday night, final minute of the fourth quarter of the Super Bowl in Arizona, Seahawks quarterback Russell Wilson throws a seemingly inexplicable interception from the New England Patriots 1-yard line with his team trailing by four points, sealing his and his team's fate.
But how about the why and the who? Hindsight makes it particularly easy to criticize Seahawks offensive coordinator Darrell Bevell and head coach Pete Carroll for the play call, Wilson for the poor decision and/or throw and wide receiver Ricardo Lockette for the route he ran, and the reality is that in a nuanced game like this, it's rarely possible to place all of the blame on one man.
Why'd it happen, and who deserves the lion's share of the blame? Let's break it down.
The play call wasn't as bad as you think
On the surface, passing on a second down from the New England 1-yard line with 26 seconds left in a one-score game does seem silly, especially when you consider these points:
According to Bob Condotta of The Seattle Times, Bevell said he called the play, that the Seahawks had the look they wanted and that Lockette could have been stronger to the ball, while Carroll denied a report that he overruled Bevell after a run was called.
Here's how Carroll defended the decision to stick with the pass, per The Seattle Times:
Here’s the deal, we sent our guys on the field, wide receivers on the field, spread them out, they ran on their goal line, they sent all their big guys out there. At that moment I didn’t want to waste a run play against their goal-line guys. Throw the ball, we’ll come in on third and fourth down, and we can match up. It’s a really clear thought, it wasn’t something that happened, it was a clear thought but it didn’t work out right. We happened to throw them the ball, and they make a big play.
Thing is, that doesn't sound all too unreasonable, which explains why Carroll is even saying he requested a throw in that situation. He explains further:
Really the way the route generally works is the back receiver gets shielded off so that the play can get thrown to the guy trailing. And it’s worked really well, it’s been a really nice concept but they jumped it, did a fantastic job. I don’t know if they prepared to do that or he did it on his own, but it was a great play.
This is a game of gambles in which hindsight is a pain in the butt.
Against the Seahawks in the NFC Championship Game, Green Bay Packers head coach Mike McCarthy was strongly criticized for kicking field goals on 4th-and-short three times in the first half. But had he gambled and failed there, he'd have taken just as much heat.
And on Sunday, Carroll had his offense run one final quick play in the red zone with six seconds left in the first half. Had time expired without Seattle putting up points, he'd have been killed by fans and media. But it paid off when Wilson threw a touchdown pass to Chris Matthews.
What would we have said about New Orleans Saints coach Sean Payton had the Indianapolis Colts recovered his surprise onside-kick attempt to start off the second half of Super Bowl XLIV?
Point being, everyone inside and outside of that stadium, including the 11 Patriots on the field, felt the ball was going to be handed to Lynch. The gamble was a decision to throw against a favorable matchup, and in this case, it didn't pay off.
The problem most of us have here is that a gamble might not have been necessary in that spot. Sure, the Patriots might have been selling out to stop Lynch, but you also have the league's top-rushing quarterback and the ability to sneak from that distance. This was a macho call when the Seahawks didn't necessarily need to be macho.
According to Advanced Football Analytics, the Seahawks' win probability before the play in question was 88 percent.
But it was by no means a crazy call, especially when you consider that the perception that Lynch is an accomplished goal-line back is actually erroneous.
Dating back to the turn of the century, 57 backs have carried the ball at least 20 times on 1st-and-goal from the 1-yard line, and only only three have scored fewer touchdowns per attempt than Lynch:
And this season, Lynch scored just once on five carries from the 1-yard line, which worked out to the lowest touchdown rate among backs with at least four attempts in that situation:
Lynch is a beast, and he is particularly beastly in the postseason, but he's at his best when he has a chance to break tackles in the open field. There's no such thing as open field on the 1-yard line against New England's goal-line defense.
Throw in that not a single interception was thrown this season on 109 passes from the 1-yard line, and the risk doesn't appear to be that large.
61 TDs thrown at the 1 this year. Zero picks before Wilson. Worrying about INT there is like not going outside due to fear of dinosaurs.
Consider also that Lynch has still fumbled the ball 12 times in the last three years. In fact, he fumbled on a run from the Washington Redskins' 1-yard line in the second half of a close playoff game just two years ago.
That said, Wilson has scored four career touchdowns on seven sneak attempts from the 1-yard line, so simply pushing forward with him might have been the most prudent approach. The general plan should have been to minimize risk, and the Seahawks ran the riskiest of the three primary options they had.
For that, because their small gamble didn't pay off, Bevell and Carroll deserve some blame. But this was also about a lack of execution from the Seahawks and great execution from the man who intercepted the pass, Malcolm Butler.
It wasn't a bad decision from Wilson
Wilson did not throw a perfect pass, but it wasn't a duck. And the decision was relatively sound. Yes, Butler was breaking for the ball before he released, but a full four yards—and two players—were still separating Lockette and Butler when Wilson was throwing the ball.
It truly was a great, instinctive defensive play from Butler, who reacted at the speed of light and cut off the route much earlier than you'd expect. Had he taken even a slightly broader angle, the Seahawks would likely be Super Bowl champions right now.
So when Carroll tried to deflect blame by heaping praise on the hero defender, he was bang on.
"He had what he was looking for," added Carroll. "The guy makes a phenomenal play that guys aren’t supposed to make, he just jumped into the route."
It wasn't a perfect throw
Had Wilson thrown the pass perfectly, it might have worked.
On the surface, and with the assumption that Butler was going to break at human speed and interrupt the route once it had flattened out, leading your receiver is the right thing to do. But regardless of his intentions, the much safer option for Wilson would have been to throw this at Lockette's numbers:
In fact, ESPN's Steve Young said on air after the game that he felt Wilson should have hit Lockette's back shoulder, which is riskier if you're weighing completion vs. incompletion but carries almost no risk of an interception.
All that said, you don't draw up plays assuming your quarterback is going to make an absolutely perfect throw. Wilson's pass wasn't terribly inaccurate and likely would have resulted in a touchdown nine times out of 10.
Lockette and Kearse probably could have done more
It's hard to dispute Bevell's suggestion that the receiver could have finished his route in stronger fashion, and the reality is Lockette was beaten physically by Butler while receiving a shoddy pick from teammate Jermaine Kearse.
This is simple: Had it been Dez Bryant or Calvin Johnson, there's a much better chance the catch would have been made. Same logic applies had the pick come from, say, Andre Johnson, rather than Kearse.
Ultimately, this came down to the performance of the 22 players on the field—particularly Wilson, Lockette, Kearse and Butler—to more of an extent than it did coaching. It's natural to feel the need to blame somebody other than your superhero quarterback or a receiver who looked at the time to be more of a victim than a culprit, but the Patriots won this game because they executed better than Seattle did on what should have been a routine play.
Melamine Crockery Brad Gagnon has covered the NFL for Bleacher Report since 2012.